This project consists of a series of individual studies which are being supported by the Nuclear Threat Initiative
Study: Institutions for security cooperation in a nuclear weapon-free world
The study systematically investigates the relationships between global and regional, formal and informal institutions within and outside of the UN system, alliances and “coalitions of the willing” which are designed to preserve international security without the umbrella of nuclear deterrence. The impact of these individual institutions on international security, their synergies and their competition are assessed.
Study: How much confidence-building among the great powers is needed to facilitate a nuclear weapons-free world?
The study stems from the consideration that a nuclear weapons-free world remains improbable as long as there are enduring rivalries or serious conflicts between great powers concerning their vital interests. In addition, steps towards that goal remain very difficult as long as great uncertainty about their intentions and military capabilities remains. The study tries to define the necessary level of confidence and appropriate steps to enhance the present degree of confidence in a way that enables the protagonists to cease regarding nuclear deterrence as a necessary condition for their national security.
Study: Conventional arms control and nuclear disarmament: What is the relationship?
This study relies on European experiences in the past sixty years. The perceived conventional superiority of the Soviet Union motivated NATO to adopt the complex doctrine of extended deterrence with its specific role for substrategic nuclear weapons. The reversal of the conventional asymmetry in Europe after the end of the Cold War permitted a drastic reduction of the nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, but NATO doctrine was not substantially changed. Today, the conventional asymmetry is disadvantageous to Russia, and Moscow consequently believes that it has to rely more strongly on the substrategic nuclear arsenal than in the past. Thus, it has renounced the former declaratory doctrine of no first use. Differing security interests in East Asia, South Asia and the Middle East complicate the interaction between nuclear and conventional arms deterrence in Europe. In the framework of these security structures, we study the new Russian doctrine and the new US Nuclear Posture Review looking for ways to facilitate the elimination of nuclear weapons.